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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of the Case 
This appeal arises from the District Court's dismissal of pro se plaintiff-
appellant Mark Colafranceschi's Second Amended Verified Complaint and Demand 
for Jury Trial against Ashley Robinson on Ms. Robinson's motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Appellant Colafranceschi's 
Second Amended Complaint asserted causes of action for defamation and 
professional malpractice related to Ms. Robinson's performance as a court-appointed 
child custody evaluator. The District Court found that the claims asserted in the 
Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) based on 
the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity and Colafranceschi's failure to plead facts 
constituting misrepresentation with sufficient specificity. Appellant Colafranceschi 
appeals both the District Court's dismissal of his action and the District Court's 
denial of appellant Colafranceschi's motion for reconsideration related thereto. 
B. Procedural History 
The initial complaint in this matter was filed on November 16, 2012, (Record 
("R.") at 9-34), and was subsequently amended by the Amended Verified Complaint 
and Demand for Jury Trial ("First Amended Complaint"), filed on December 6, 
2012. (R. at 35-52.) 
Following service, appellee Robinson filed a motion to dismiss the First 
Amended Complaint, on January 16, 2013. (R. at 321.) Following briefing upon 
Robinson's motion, along with defendant-appellee Shawn Briley's and defendant 
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Kim Batt-Lincoln's similar motions, argument was held on April 15, 2013. (See 
generally, Transcript, April 15, 2013, ("April Tr.")). At hearing, the District Court 
granted appellee Robinson's motion to dismiss, directing submission of a second 
amended complaint to set forth "specific facts of fraud or misrepresentation in 
obtaining the appointment" as child custody evaluator. (April Tr. 11. 36:22-37:6.) A 
related Order was subsequently issued on April 30, 2013. (R. at 293-295.)1 
The Second Amended Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
("Second Amended Complaint") was filed on April 25, 2013. (R. at 142-286.) 
Appellee Robinson subsequently filed her Renewed Motion to Dismiss on May 7, 
2013. (R. at 422-423.) Following briefing,2 argument was held on June 17, 2013.3 
(See generally, Transcript, Jun 17, 2013 ("June Tr.")). The Court thereafter issued 
its written Order Dismissing the Second Amended Verified Complaint on 
September 16, 2013, on the grounds of quasi-judicial immunity and failure to 
sufficiently plead misrepresentation. (R. at 296-299.) 
Appellant Colafranceschi then filed his Motion to Reconsider Order 
Dismissing Claim on September 24, 2013, (R. at 300-306.) After briefing, the 
District Court issued its Order Denying Motion to Reconsider, and related 
Judgment, on November 5, 2013. (R. at 307-310.) 
Appellant Colafranceschi filed his Notice of Appeal on December 13, 2013. 
1 Neither the order dismissing appellant Colafranceschi's First Amended Complaint and requiring 
submission of a further amended complaint, nor the dismissal of defendant Batt-Lincoln, have been 
appealed by appellant Colafranceschi. 
2 While appellant Colafranceschi filed a "Motion to Strike" regarding the renewed motions to 
dismiss, appellant failed to otherwise submit a written opposition to appellant Robinson's Renewed 
Motion to Dismiss prior to the hearing on that motion. (See generally, R. at 7; June Tr., at 11. 70:7-9.) 
3 Appellee Briley's renewed motion to dismiss was also addressed at the June 7, 2013, hearing. 
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(R. at 313-315.) 
C. Statement of Facts4 
"On review of a district court's I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court views 
all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Allied Bail 
Bonds, Inc. v. Cnty. of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 409, 258 P.3d 340, 344 (2011). With 
this admonition in mind, the "facts" of this matter-the allegations contained in 
appellant Colafranceschi's Second Amended Complaint-are summarized as 
follows. 
Robinson is an LMSW (Licensed Masters Social Worker). (R. at 143, <J{3.) 
Per the Second Amended Complaint, Robinson previously testified that, upon 
moving to McCall, she sent the court a letter and resume detailing her experience, 
offering to assist the Court.5 (R. at 144, !J[3.) Robinson testified that she later had 
lunch with Valley County Magistrate Henry R. Boomer and other county 
personnel in January 2011, to discuss the prospect of doing work for the courts 
and Valley County. (Id. at !J[4.) Robinson denied discussing Colafranceschi's cases 
at that lunch. (Id. at !J[4.) 
On February 2, 2011, Judge Boomer, in a matter entitled Mark D. 
Colafranceschi v. Durena Schoonover, Valley County Case No. CV 2010-312-C 
("Schoonover"), entered an Amended Order for Child Custody Evaluation 
appointing appellant Robinson to complete a child custody evaluation in that 
4 Appellant Colafranceschi's "Statement of Facts/Arguements" [sic] section does not clarify that many 
of the 'facts' identified - particularly as to the alleged misconduct by appellee Robinson - are merely 
allegations stated in his Second Amended Complaint, and have not in any way been established or 
otherwise proven in the litigation. 
5 The Second Amended Complaint does not attach copies of that letter or the resume. 
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case, with the cost of the home study to be shared by the parties, subject to 
reapportionment. (R. at 145-146, <J{12, & 168-169.) On February 7, 2011, Judge 
Boomer, in another matter entitled Mark D. Colafranceschi v. Susie Ericson, Valley 
County Case No. 06-521 ("Ericson"), entered an Amended Order for Child Custody 
Evaluation appointing Robinson to complete a child custody evaluation in that 
case, with the cost of the home study to be shared by the parties. (R. 171.) In both 
Ericson and Schoonover the parties, including Colafranceschi, entered into a 
written Informed Consent For Participants agreement with Robinson. (R. 173-
197 .) The Agreements confirmed that child custody evaluations had been ordered 
by the Court and that Robinson did not work for either parent. (Id.) The Second 
Amended Complaint does not assert that appellant Colafranceschi made any 
objection to the appointment of Robinson, in either matter, at the time of 
appointment. 
In both Ericson and Schoonover, Robinson conducted evaluations for the 
purpose of making written child custody and visitation recommendations to the 
Court. (R. at 198-240.) Robinson's evaluation(s) included interviews with the 
parents and children; observations of the children with each parent; interviews of 
other members of each parent's household; a review of documents and collateral 
interviews of individuals who were identified by the parents. (Id.) Both 
evaluations were filed in their respective actions on April 18, 2011. (Id.) 
Judge Boomer's decision in Ericson was reheard by Judge Comstock on 
August 28 and 29, 2012. (R. at 160, <J{75.) Following testimony, Judge Comstock 
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ruled that Robinson was not qualified as an expert, excluding her report from 
evidence. (R. at 150, <J[30.) Judge Comstock is quoted as stating: 
I have some experience with the AFCC model standards. I know 
there is some concern about folks that get into forensic custody 
evaluation who start doing that without the careful supervision with 
someone that has handled these before. She has handled them 
before in the context of dependency proceedings but not in any 
private civil cases involving post divorce, or divorce or custody 
modification or initial custody cases it's a different analysis it's a 
different type of recommendation. The end result is different 
because of the legal standards that differ between dependency 
proceedings and child custody law. 
(Id.) The Second Amended Complaint concedes that while asserting that Ms. 
Robinson had not performed a private home study prior to appointment, she "had 
done case work with foster care children and health and welfare case." (R. at 144, 
<J[6.) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err m dismissing appellant 
Colafranceschi's Second Amended Complaint? 
2. Did the District Court err in denying appellant Colafranceschi's 
motion to reconsider the dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint? 
3. Is appellee Robinson entitled to costs if she prevails on appeal? 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Appellee Robinson only seeks an award of those costs awarded as a matter of 
course should she prevail, pursuant to I.A.R. 40. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
The motion submitted by Appellee Robinson, and ruled upon by the District 
Court, was a motion to dismiss made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).6 (R. at 296-296 
& 422-423.) The applicable standard of review, as set forth by this Court, is as 
follows: 
The Court's standard of review for an order of the district court 
dismissing a case pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is the same as the 
summary judgment standard of review. See Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi 
Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999); see also 
Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563 
(1995). After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor 
of the non-moving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief 
has been stated. Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 398, 987 P.2d at 310. "The 
issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether 
the party is 'entitled to offer evidence to support the claims."' Id., citing 
Orthman 126 Idaho at 962, 895 P.2d at 563, quoting Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90, 96 
(1974) (citation omitted). 
Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 667, 115 P.3d 756, 758 (2005) (quoting Bradbury 
v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 67, 28 P.3d 1006, 1010 (2001)). 
Similarly, "when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion 
for reconsideration, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the 
lower court in deciding the motion for reconsideration." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 
Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). 
6 Appellant Colafranceschi incorrectly cites the summary judgment rule, Rule 56, as the applicable 
rule at issue on appeal. (Appellant's Brief at 15.) 
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B. The District Court's decision dismissing the Second Amended 
Complaint should be affirmed. 
1. The District Court's dismissal. 
In ruling upon appellee Robinson's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the District 
Court summarized the allegations made by appellant Colafranceschi in his Second 
Amended Complaint as follows: 
According to the Second Amended Complaint, Robinson sent a letter to 
the Court with her resume, offering her assistance to the Court. The 
specific contents of that letter are not set forth. Within a short time 
the presiding Judge in the two custody disputes in which the Plaintiff 
was involved met with Robinson, along with others. Thereafter, 
Robinson was appointed as the home evaluator by the presiding judge. 
According to the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, "Ms. Robinson 
willfully misrepresented her qualifications to the court staff. Ms. 
Robinson claimed to have experience in home studies when in fact she 
had never done a home study of this sort. She had done case work 
with foster care children and health and welfare cases. Ms. Robinson 
had never performed a private home study-like the one involved." 
The Amended Complaint alleges that Robinson did not begin the 
process of becoming a clinical licensed social worker until after the 
custody proceedings involved. 
(R. at 296-297 .) The District Court determined that such allegations fail to 
establish a cause of action against appellee Robinson in light of the quasi-judicial 
immunity doctrine: 
Reduced to its basics the Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that Robinson 
misrepresented to the Court her qualifications to perform the home 
study. If that be the case, it should not have occurred. Nonetheless 
that allegation does not defeat the application of the doctrine of quasi-
judicial immunity to the Defendant. Her background was subject to 
scrutiny prior the completion of the home study. The report itself was 
subject to scrutiny, and the competence of the evaluator was subject to 
critical examination concerning her expertise and the contents of the 
evaluation. If there were an ethical violation, that would be the 
subject of review by the appropriate supervising authorities. If the 
Court for which the report was prepared determined that there was 
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insufficient expertise to justify acceptance of the evaluation, the Court 
could disregard the evaluation. The Plaintiff could challenge the facts 
and conclusions of the evaluation by other evidence. In sum, there are 
remedial avenues short of exposing an evaluator to open ended 
litigation if there is a perceived flaw in the appointment process. 
(R. at 297.) The District Court mused that there might be a loss of the immunity in 
some fraudulent appointment scenario, but that appellant Colafranceschi alleged no 
such facts as would preserve his action: 
In high conflict custody cases there is likely discontent in many 
situations. The protection of those who do such evaluations afforded 
by the principle of quasi-judicial immunity is significant. It should not 
be lost easily. Allegations of fraud or some other mischief in obtaining 
an appointment might rise to the level of eliminating the shield, 
particularly if there are no avenues to remediate the alleged 
misconduct. The allegations of the Second Amended Complaint do not 
rise to that level. 
(R. at 297.) (emphasis added). 
2. Quasi-judicial immunity in Idaho, generally. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of quasi-judicial 
immunity in McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 150, 937 P.2d 1222, 1224 (1997). In 
McKay, the Court was asked to decide whether or not an attorney, who had been 
appointed by the court as a minor's guardian ad litem, could be sued for 
malpractice.7 The attorney argued that since he had been acting as a court 
appointed guardian ad litem, he was an "arm of the court" and should be granted 
quasi-judicial immunity status. In examining this question, the Court applied a 
"functional approach" to determine if the guardian ad litem performed a function 
7 "Parenting Coordinators," also appointed in Idaho family law actions after custody orders are 
entered, are expressly afforded immunity by rule. I.R.C.P. 16(l)(K)(" The Parenting Coordinator has 
qualified judicial immunity in accordance with Idaho law as to all acts undertaken pursuant to and 
consistent with the order of appointment."). 
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related to the judicial process: 
We have not previously considered this question in Idaho, but we 
note that the "arm of the court" analysis stems from an analysis 
employed by the United States Supreme Court. That Court stated 
that it has "applied a 'functional approach' . . . which looks to 'the 
nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who 
performed it."' Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 113 S.Ct. 
2606, 2613, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993) (citations omitted). Therefore, 
the question becomes whether a guardian ad litem, acting under I.C. 
§ 5-306, is functioning as an arm of the court. 
McKay, 130 Idaho at 156, 937 P.2d at 1230. In applying the "functional analysis" 
to a guardian's duties, the Court found: 
Using the functional analysis employed by the United States 
Supreme Court, the guardian's duty under LC. § 5-306 is to consider 
all of the alternatives and give its recommendation to the Court 
based on what will be best for the ward. Therefore, the guardian can 
be seen as an "agent of the court." 
Id. at 157, 937 P.2d at 1231 (citations omitted). Having found that a court-
appointed guardian was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, the McKay Court then 
examined the policies behind quasi-judicial immunity: 
Although I.C. § 5-306 itself, and the proceedings below, do not 
provide a clear-cut answer to the issue, the policies behind quasi-
judicial immunity lead us to the conclusion that guardians under 
I.C. § 5-306 should be given absolute quasi- judicial immunity. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court noted that although a guardian may even 
act as an advocate to some degree, quasi-judicial immunity is not 
inappropriate. Specifically, that court held that: 
A guardian ad litem is an officer of the court. The guardian's 
duty is to act within the course of that judicial proceeding 
in furtherance of the best interests of the child for whom 
the guardian has been appointed. A guardian must be 
free, in furtherance of the goal for which the 
appointment was made, to engage in a vigorous and 
autonomous representation of the child. Immunity is 
necessary to avoid harassment from disgruntled parents 
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who may take ISsue with any or all of the guardian's 
actions. 
Tindell v. Rogosheske. 428 N.W.2d 386, 387 (Minn. 1988) (citations 
omitted). Similarly, although written in the context of a custody 
dispute, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado 
stated that: 
[t]o safeguard the best interests of the children, [ ], 
the guardian's judgment must remain impartial, unaltered 
by the intimidating wrath and litigious penchant of 
disgruntled parents. Fear of liability ... can warp judgment 
that is crucial to vigilant loyalty for what is best for the 
child; the guardian's focus must not be diverted to 
appeasement of antagonistic parents. Short (ex rel. 
Oosterhous v. Short], 730 F. Supp. [1037,] at 1039 [(D. Colo. 
1990)]. Further, qualified attorneys might be unwilling to 
represent a child if "disgruntled or vituperative parents could 
hold the guardian ad litem personally responsible." Delcourt 
(v. Silverman], 919 S.W.2d [777,] at 785 [(Tex. App. 1996)]. 
Id. at 157-58. 
More recently, in Abolafia v. Reeves, 152 Idaho 898, 277 P.3d 345 (2012), the 
Court evaluated whether, once a judicial appointment was terminated by the Court, 
immunity continued to exist to bar an award of appeal costs against a former 
guardian who elected to appeal a court decision after his termination as guardian: 
After considering the comments by the parties and their respective 
counsel and Adler's comments, the magistrate court stated that it 
accepted the stipulation, and it orally granted the motion to terminate 
Adler as guardian ad litem. On February 15, 2008, the court entered 
the order terminating Adler as guardian ad litem and the order 
modifying the divorce decree pursuant to the parties' stipulation. 
On March 21, 2008, Adler, acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal, 
stating that he was appealing from the order modifying the divorce 
decree and from the order terminating him as guardian ad litem. 
Id. at 901, 277 P.3d at 348. The Court further held that no such immunity survived 
post-termination: 
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Finally, Adler argues that while discharging his duties as guardian ad 
litem, he had quasi-immunity that protected him from an award of 
attorney fees. In making that argument, he relies upon McKay v. 
Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 937 P.2d 1222 (1997). In McKay, an attorney 
was appointed pursuant to Idaho Code section 5-306 as a child's 
guardian ad litem in order to make recommendations to the court 
regarding the proposed settlement of the child's personal injury action. 
We held that a guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 5-306 to represent a child who was a party in a personal injury 
action had absolute quasi-immunity because the guardian must be free 
to make recommendations to the court that the guardian believes are 
in the child's best interests. Id. at 157, 937 P.2d at 1231. That case 
does not support quasi-immunity here because Adler was not guardian 
ad litem for the children at the time he filed his appeal. 
The discussion between Adler and the Court continued, and Adler 
correctly stated, "I serve at the pleasure of the court." When the court 
did not do what Adler wanted, he decided that he served at his own 
pleasure and filed the appeal. The sole purpose of the appeal was to 
assuage his hurt pride. He has provided absolutely no argument or 
authority that would even remotely support his assertion that he has 
standing to appeal. All he has done is increase the cost to the parties. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Father and 
Mother attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121 
on the ground that Adler brought this appeal unreasonably and 
without foundation. 
Id. at 905, 277 P.3d at 352. 
3. Appellant Robinson is protected by quasi-judicial immunity, 
including the appointment process. 
a. Immunity appropriately extends to the appointment 
process and to evaluators such as Ms. Robinson. 
In this action, appellee Colafranceschi attempts to carve out from quasi-
judicial immunity a key and necessary portion of appellee Robinson's service as an 
"arm of the court"-the appointment process. While the Idaho Supreme Court has 
made clear in Abolafia that immunity ceases at what should be a readily-apparent 
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point (the juncture at which the court terminates the appointment), nothing in 
either the McKay and Abolafia decision suggest any limitation on the immunity for 
the appointment process, which is part and parcel of the services provided by the 
appointee. 
This issue of immunity in the appointment process was recently explored in 
California, in La Serena Properties v. Weisbach, 186 Cal. App. 4th 893, 905, 112 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 597, 605 (2010). In La Serena, the California Court of Appeal (1st 
District) examined the question of whether an arbitrator, who allegedly deliberately 
concealed a conflict in order to secure consent to serve as an arbitrator, was 
precluded from asserting the immunity. The La Serena Court rejected the claim 
attempting to defeat immunity on alleged defects in appointment, discussing other 
authority, and noting: 
As to appellants' argument that the arbitral immunity should not be 
applied because the failure to disclose occurred, before the 
decisionmaking process began, this same contention was made by the 
plaintiff in Olson [v. Nat'l Ass'n Securities Dealers], supra, 85 F.3d 381 
[(8th Cir. 1996)]. The court rejected the argument concluding that "[t]he 
appointment of arbitrators is a necessary part of arbitration 
administration, however, and thus is protected by arbitral immunity." 
(Id. at p. 383.) 
This rationale is compelling and equally applicable here. While 
disclosures take place before the arbitrator's appointment becomes 
final, and certainly before the commencement of the arbitration itself, 
it is an integral part of the arbitration process. Indeed, the rules and 
statutes governing the disclosures by arbitrators make it clear that 
such disclosures are to occur when the arbitrator is "proposed." 
Similarly, judges are expected to make the disclosures required of 
them before the adjudicative function of the courts begin. (Rothman, 
California Judicial Conduct Handbook (3d ed. 2007) Appen. F, pp. 4-6.) 
Indeed, we have been reminded recently that a judge's disqualification 
"occurs when the facts creating disqualification arise, not when 
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disqualification is established. [Citations.]" (Christie v. City of El 
Centro (2006) 135 Cal. App. 4th 767, 776, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718.) 
Therefore, any claimed misconduct by the arbitrator in association 
with the failure to make a required disclosure at the inception of his or 
her selection was sufficiently associated with the arbitration process 
itself to justify the application of arbitral immunity. 
La Serena, 186 Cal. App. 4th at 905, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 605. The court further 
buttressed this decision by noting that, "[i]n other contexts, similar attempts by 
plaintiffs to avoid an immunity or privilege by creative pleading have been rejected 
uniformly by courts." Id. at 906, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 606. Thus, the La Serena 
Court considered the appointment process (and any defects therein) to still be 
within the scope of the immunity. The same would be true in the context of the 
appointment of a court-appointed evaluator, as here, which, as a matter of the basic 
appointment process, requires an initial evaluation by the Court as to the 
appropriateness of an individual for appointment. 
Additionally, the California Court of Appeal (1st District), even more 
recently, reaffirmed that the quasi-judicial immunity doctrine generally extended to 
child custody evaluators. In Bergeron v. Boyd, 223 Cal. App. 4th 877, 167 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 426 (2014), a parent, unhappy with reporting and orders by a child custody 
evaluator, filed suit, asserting the evaluator failed to perform appropriately, 
including the assertion that the evaluator failed to be properly appointed as the 
Court's expert under California Evidence Code section 730. Id. at 882, 167 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 431. Discussing an earlier decision, Howard v. Drapkin, 222 Cal. App. 
3d 843, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Ct. App. 1990), the Bergeron court explained: 
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The principle case authority discussing the evolution of the common 
law quasi-judicial privilege in California, and one factually similar to 
the instant case, is Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal. App. 3d 843, 
271 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Howard). In Howard, the defendant was a 
psychologist who was sued by a disgruntled parent/family court 
litigant after performing a child custody evaluation. After tracing the 
history and rationale for the common law development of a quasi-
judicial privilege, the Court of Appeal concluded that persons 
performing acts that are judicial in nature are protected by the 
privilege. In making this determination, the court emphasized that it 
is the act performed, not the title of the person performing it, which is 
determinative: "So also, in determining whether a person is acting in a 
quasi-judicial fashion, the courts look at 'the nature of the duty 
performed [to determine] whether it is a judicial act-not the name or 
classification of the officer who performs it, and many who are properly 
classified as executive officers are invested with limited judicial 
powers.' (Pearson v. Reed [ (1935) ] 6 Cal. App. 2d [277,] 286-287, 44 
P.2d 592.)" (Howard, supra, at p. 853, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893.) 
Turning to the function of the family law custody evaluator in that 
case, the Howard court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to analogize the 
action to one for professional malpractice: "In contrast, the psychologist 
who is mediating a child custody dispute, whether by court 
appointment or not, is not an advocate for either parent, even if paid 
by them. [Citation.] The job of third parties such as mediators, 
conciliators and evaluators involves impartiality and neutrality, as 
does that of a judge, commissioner or referee; hence, there should be 
entitlement to the same immunity given others who function as 
neutrals in an attempt to resolve disputes. In a sense, those persons 
are similar to a judge who is handling a voluntary or mandatory 
settlement conference, no matter whether they are (1) making binding 
decisions (such as referees acting pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 638, 
subd. (1), and arbitrators), (2) making recommendations to the court 
(such as referees acting under Code Civ. Proc., § 639 or mediators 
acting under Civ. Code, § 4607), or (3) privately attempting to settle 
disputes, such as the defendant here. [<J[] We therefore hold that 
absolute quasi-judicial immunity is properly extended to these neutral 
third parties for their conduct in performing dispute resolution services 
which are connected to the judicial process and involve either (1) the 
making of binding decisions, (2) the making of findings or 
recommendations to the court or (3) the arbitration, mediation, 
conciliation, evaluation or other similar resolution of pending disputes. 
As the defendant was clearly engaged in this latter activity, she is 
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entitled to the protection of such quasi-judicial immunity." (Howard, 
supra, 222 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 859-860, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893.) 
Bergeron v. Boyd, 223 Cal. App. 4th at 884-85. The Howard decision referred to by 
the Bergeron Court explained the public policy rationale, as quoted by the Bergeron 
court: 
As the Howard court explained later in its opinion, it is the function 
being exercised by the immunized individual that is the focus of the 
privilege's application and not the status or capacity of the individual 
that controls. (Howard, supra, 222 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 853-855, 271 
Cal. Rptr. 893.) The reasons for doing so are clear: "We are persuaded 
that the approach of the federal courts is consistent with the relevant 
policy considerations of attracting to an overburdened judicial system 
the independent and impartial services and expertise upon which that 
system necessarily depends. Thus, we believe it appropriate that these 
'nonjudicial persons who fulfill quasi-judicial functions intimately 
related to the judicial process' [citation] should be given absolute 
quasi-judicial immunity for damage claims arising from their 
performance of duties in connection with the judicial process. Without 
such immunity, such persons will be reluctant to accept court 
appointments or provide work product for the courts' use. 
Additionally, the threat of civil liability may affect the manner 
in which they perform their jobs. [Citation.]" 
Bergeron v. Boyd, 223 Cal. App. 4th at 887, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 431 (emphasis 
added). 
This echoes the Idaho Supreme Court's discussion of policy concerns in the 
McKay decision, which ruling does not suggest avenues to sue individuals appointed 
by the Court because of alleged defects at any time during the appointment and 
service of that individual: "It is absolutely essential that guardians are free to make 
such a determination, without fear that a parent, seeking a larger award or 
settlement amount, will later sue the guardian for legal malpractice." McKay, 130 
Idaho at 158. Ensuring that the cloak of immunity also encapsulates the 
RESPONDENT ROBINSON'S BRIEF 15 
appointment process advances the ultimate goal intended by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. Undermining this policy, by allowing the kind of "creative pleading" warned 
of in La Serena, would invite chaos in the form of lawsuits against court-appointed 
individuals based simply upon bare allegations of defects in the appointment 
process and likely cripple the ability of Idaho courts (especially those in rural 
counties with limited expert pools to draw from) to secure the aid of guardians, 
evaluators, and similar personnel who are critical in aiding the courts to make 
sound and well-informed determinations, especially in family law matters. 
Moreover, the emphasis on ensuring that evaluators are protected by quasi-
judicial immunity was also discussed by the Alaska Supreme Court in Lythgoe v. 
Gunn, 884 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1994). In that matter, a court-appointed custody 
investigator was appointed in a divorce and custody proceeding. Id. at 1086. 
During the course of the proceeding, the investigator's reports and testimony were 
ultimately stricken apparently based upon qualification concerns, and one party 
sued the investigator: 
In early 1992 the superior court Judge Andrews appointed Dr. Janet 
Guinn as an independent custody investigator in a divorce and custody 
proceeding involving Jacqueline Lythgoe, her ex-husband Paul 
Wellman, and their six-year-old son, Under the terms of this 
appointment, the parties were each required to pay half of the costs 
and fees incurred by the investigator. The court further ordered the 
parties to fully cooperate with Dr. Guinn's investigation. Dr. Guinn's 
report recommended that Wellman be given sole custody of the child. 
Lythgoe filed a motion requesting that a separate evaluation be 
performed, which was granted. Judge Andrews also ordered an in 
camera review of files maintained by the State Division of 
Occupational Licensing pertaining to an investigation of Dr. Guinn "to 
determine if there are any relevant documents ... relating to Guinn's 
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qualifications or the weight to give her report or testimony." Following 
this inspection, the court ordered that "all reports and testimony 
produced by Dr. Guinn be stricken from the record." The court further 
directed that none of the documents produced by Dr. Guinn be 
provided to the new custody evaluator. 
In October 1992 Lythgoe filed suit against Dr. Guinn, alleging that she 
performed the custody investigation negligently, willfully and 
wantonly, that she intentionally or negligently misrepresented 
statements of third parties in her report, that she failed to conform to 
the minimum professional standards for licensed psychologists in the 
State of Alaska, that she violated statutes governing such 
professionals, and that she breached her fiduciary duties to Lythgoe. In 
an amended complaint, Lythgoe further alleged that Dr. Guinn acted 
as an advocate for Wellman, thereby forfeiting any immunity she 
might have had. 
Id. The court granted immunity to the appointed psychologist, irrespective of the 
ultimate exclusion of her opinions and report, confirming the underlying public 
policy grounds for the granting of immunity: 
On the contrary, several courts have noted that adequate remedies and 
safeguards, other than civil liability, exist to hold court-appointed 
experts accountable for their actions. For example, in LaLonde 
[Eissner, 539 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Mass. 1989)], the court stated that 
"[w]hile we are cognizant of the need to prevent negligently performed 
evaluations, our judicial system has inherent safeguards that minimize 
the risk of decisions based on inaccurate, misleading, or negligently 
conducted evaluations." In particular, the court noted that, where the 
expert testifies or the expert's report is presented to the court, the 
complaining party has the opportunity to examine the expert and bring 
to the judge's attention any alleged deficiencies in the evaluation. In 
addition, the court further noted that the complaining party is "free to 
seek appellate review or ... request a modification of the [trial court's] 
order." 
In the present case, Lythgoe successfully availed herself of such 
alternative remedies. She deposed Dr. Guinn and presented her 
objections to the trial court, which issued an order that Dr. Guinn's 
report be stricken from the record. She additionally would have had 
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the opportunity to seek appellate review had the trial court denied her 
motion to exclude Dr. Guinn's report. These alternative mechanisms 
for review are "largely free of the harmful side-effects inevitably 
associated with exposing judges [and quasi-judicial officers] to personal 
liability." Thus, Lythgoe's public policy argument is unpersuasive. 
Id. at 1091 (internal citations omitted). Lythgoe is factually similar to this matter, 
and demonstrates that, as here, the remedy for allegedly unqualified individuals 
and/or deficient evaluations is through exclusion of the witness, appeal, etc.8 In 
fact, here, appellant Colafranceschi even specifically asserts that Robinson was 
excluded as an expert on Rule 702 grounds, precisely the kind of remedy 
contemplated by Lythgoe in lieu of civil litigation.9 (R. at 150, <J[30.) 
Similarly, Colafranceschi complains that Robinson was "converted to the 
defense expert witness," both in light of her testimony and alleged preparation by 
8 As an aside, this Court recently affirmed a lower court's partial rejection of a custody evaluator's 
recommendations on Rule 702 grounds. Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278, 286-287, 281 P.3d 115, 123-
124 (2012). Interestingly, the Clair decision quotes the magistrate in the underlying proceeding, who 
himself appeared to question what standards (AFCC, APA, or otherwise) might apply to evaluations 
(which AFCC standards were also discussed in the exclusion of Ms. Robinson): "The foundation for 
some opinion testimony at this point is lacking in my view because I don't think we quite got there to 
whether there are or are not commonly accepted criteria or standards in the counseling field on how 
to conduct a child custody evaluation whether nationally or locally. Our State Legislature and our 
Supreme Court has not gone along yet with the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts to 
adopt the model Standards of Practice. I don't know at this juncture what the American 
Psychological Association or any other national association say the guidelines for the conduct of child 
custody evaluations are or what they should be in comparison to what Dr. Vereen has done here." 
Id. at 287; R. at 150, <]{30. 
9 Appellant Colafranceschi offers the inapposite hypothetical analogue of a non-lawyer somehow 
becoming a judge, thereby lacking "judicial immunity." (Appellant's Brief at 7.) While such a person 
is likely still considered to have acted as a judge (see, e.g., Rosell v. Cent. W. Motor Stages, Inc., 89 
S.W.3d 643, 651 (Tex. App. 2002) (regarding challenge to judge alleged to lack a law license: "When a 
judge is holding office under the color of law and discharging his duties of office, his acts are 
conclusive as to all parties and cannot be attacked in an appeal, even though the person acting as 
judge lacks the necessary qualifications and is incapable of legally holding the office.")), a more 
correct analogy in this instance would be an attorney who secured a family law magistrate seat, 
having told the magistrate commission of his/her experience in family law, but is ultimately revealed 
(after taking the bench) to have only done adoptions and uncontested divorces, but never any 
contested child custody proceedings. While there certainly might be an investigation by the Idaho 
Judicial Council, and appellate review of those matters handled by the judge, the lack of on-point 
experience does not invalidate the person's position on the bench so as to waive his/her immunity. 
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opposmg counsel, thereby having "no jurisdiction in this matter"-presumably a 
waiver argument. (R. at 155, <J[<J[42, 51-52, & 59.) This argument, in essence, 
contends that Robinson waived quasi-judicial immunity through advocacy for the 
defendants. The Lythgoe court, however, also rejected a similar "waiver by 
advocacy" argument: 
Lythgoe also argues that Dr. Guinn abandoned her neutral role and 
assumed the role of an advocate for Wellman, thereby waiving any 
immunity to which Guinn was entitled .... In the present case, all of 
Lythgoe's allegations arise from Dr. Guinn's role as a court-appointed 
custody investigator .... To accept Lythgoe's argument would render 
quasi-judicial immunity meaningless and defeat the purposes 
underlying the doctrine, as it would open the door to allegations of 
waiver by advocacy in every case where the quasi-judicial officer 
makes a recommendation contrary to a party's position. 
Id. at 1092. Thus, appellant's argument on this point fails, as well. 
b. Other appropriate remedies-other than loss of 
immunity-can address conduct by, and I or deficiencies 
with, court-appointed personnel. 
Concerns about failures by such court-appointed personnel are adequately 
addressed through other mechanisms, which keep such personnel professionally 
responsible and further ensure that the integrity of the court actions they serve in is 
maintained. As noted above, Judge Schroeder explained that, in Idaho, "there are 
remedial avenues short of exposing an evaluator to open ended litigation if there is 
a perceived flaw in the appointment process." (R. at 297.) Remedial measures that 
could be applied to court-appointed personnel were discussed in another California 
decision, as well, in the context of guardians ad litem: 
The countervailing policy present here is the accountability of 
guardians ad litem, but there are sufficient mechanisms in place to 
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address such concerns. First, immunity is limited to acts within the 
scope of the guardian's authority. Second, in addition to a guardian ad 
litem, wards generally have legal counsel as well, as was the case here. 
Third, as we have noted, guardians ad litem are appointed by and 
subject to the supervision of the trial court. The trial court can remove 
a guardian if he or she is not performing responsibly, either on its own 
motion or at a party's request. Fourth, the trial court's decisions are 
ultimately subject to review by an appropriate writ or appeal. 
Ultimately, both the parties and the judicial system are best served by 
addressing any issues with the guardian ad litem's performance during 
the initial case, rather than by a subsequent lawsuit collaterally 
attacking the original judgment. 
McClintock v. W., 219 Cal. App. 4th 540, 552, 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 70 (2013). 
The availability of remedial avenues in an action such as appellant's is even 
born out by the fact that Colafranceschi's argument remains predicated on the 
court's ultimate rejection of Robinson as an expert by Judge Comstock based upon 
Rule 702 concerns. (R. at 150, <J[30.)10 Thus, immunity is appropriately afforded, 
given that the more appropriate avenue for challenging the ability of an expert to 
testify on experience grounds is via a motion to exclude based upon Rule 702, not 
via a lawsuit. See Lythgoe v. Gunn, 884 P.2d at 1091 ("On the contrary, several 
courts have noted that adequate remedies and safeguards, other than civil liability, 
exist to hold court-appointed experts accountable for their actions. . .. These 
alternative mechanisms for review are 'largely free of the harmful side-effects 
inevitably associated with exposing judges [and quasi-judicial officers] to personal 
liability."'). 
10 Note that the rejection of appellee Robinson as an expert under Rule 702, as alleged, was not 
predicated on any kind of misrepresentation regarding her history of performing custodial 
evaluations prior to her appointment, but instead is alleged to have been based upon Judge 
Comstock's finding that additional experience in a specific subset of custodial evaluations was 
required. (R. at 150, '1[30.) 
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The allegations of the Second Amended Complaint, and appellant 
Colafranceschi's arguments on appeal, both highlight the concerns about open-
ended litigation, and the availability of alternative remedies. Contrary to appellant 
Colafranceschi's assertions, this litigation does not merely assert that Ms. Robinson 
(and Ms. Briley) fraudulently obtained an evaluator appointment that resulted in a 
paid-for home study to be thrown out; instead, the Second Amended Complaint 
contains far more wide-ranging allegations, including: 
• A complaint about the process for transporting the child to interviews (R. 
151, <J[37); 
• A broad string-citation to multiple sections of the "Association of Family and 
Conciliation Courts Model Standards of Practice for Child Custody 
Evaluation" (R. at 152, <J[38); 
• Complaints about Robinson's pre-hearing preparation with attorney Todd 
Wilcox (R. at 153, <J[<J[39 & 42); 
• The assertion that Robinson launched a "negligence and defamation 
campaign" during her appointment (R. at 153, <J[40); 
• Complaints about Robinson's payment policy (R. 153-154, <J[<J[45-47); 
• Complaints about Robinson contacting McCall police regarding harassment 
by Colafranceschi (R. at 155, <J[50); 
• A dispute regarding the contents of the Robinson's report re: the likelihood of 
Colafranceschi to kidnap his children (R. at 157, <J[<J[59, 84, & 87); 
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• Allegations that co-defendant/appellee Shawn Briley "has a long history of 
domestic violence and fabricating frivolous claims against the father of her 
own child," including alleged details of an arrest for domestic violence (R. at 
158, !][!][64-65; 160, !][77); 
• An allegation that co-defendant/appellee Shawn Briley offered him beer in 
2010 (R. at 160, 1[78); 
• A dispute regarding the handling of an alleged statement by Robinson that 
one child wanted to kill his father (R. at 161, 1[1[85-86); 
• A complaint that Robinson (and Briley) had "failed to investigate the majority 
of instances of abuse directed to child by mother, along with parental 
alienation by mother and harassment of plaintiff' (R. at 162, 1[88); 
• Complaints regarding alleged coaching of a child's testimony by the mother, 
and an asserted lack of consistency between Colafranceschi's 
"pleadings/complaint" and "the statements made by child in interview with 
Ashley Robinson" (R. at 162-163, 1[1[91-92) 
• A dispute regarding a particular course of events reported in Robinson's 
report involving an alleged school disruption by Colafranceschi in 2006 (R. at 
163, 1[93); and 
• A dispute regarding the suitability of certain babysitters. (R. at 163, 1[94.) 
Thus, the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint do, in fact, seek to 
essentially revisit several disputes in the underlying family law action-despite the 
fact that such complaints, disputes, and allegations are more appropriately raised 
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in that family law action. Indeed, Robinson's expert status itself was successfully 
challenged on Rule 702 grounds in the underlying family law action. 
Appellant Colafranceschi, apparently recognizing the fact that there are, in 
fact, other remedial measures, instead argues that this action is forced by the lack 
of ability to recover home study costs: "The home studies were ultimately not used 
in either child custody case and are therefore deemed a waste of money for plaintiff. 
... In the case of a magistrate excluding a home study where the evaluators 
attained the position correctly there is no recourse to recoup the money for the 
evaluation that was not used. . . . Plaintiff has not been able to recover from the 
financial loss of paying for home evaluations." (Appellants' Brief at 6 & 13.) Of 
course, this is unfounded-the family law court sets responsibility for costs for the 
home evaluation, can reserve the right to reapportion, and has the presumptive 
discretionary power to direct a return of payments by the evaluator or otherwise 
excuse payment by the parties) if appropriate (e.g., failure to complete evaluation, 
termination of appointment based on conduct, etc.). (R. at 169 & 171.)11 
The sole authority cited by appellant Colafranceschi-an unpublished12 
decision from the Minnesota Court of Appeals, Kuberka v. Anoka Mediation, Inc., 
No. A05-2490, 2007 WL 3525 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2007)-does not dictate a 
11 While not part of the record in this matter, the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that, after 
the instant appeal was filed, appellant Colafranceschi sought a return of home study fees in the 
Schoonover matter (Valley County Case No. 10-312) via motion filed January 14, 2014, as reflected 
in the Repository. In light of the District Court decision and appeal in this instant action, Robinson 
(and Briley) intervened, opposing such motion. As per the Repository, the District Court ultimately 
denied Colafranceschi's motion, and awarded fees and costs to Robinson and Briley. The Repository 
does not appear to reflect any similar motion made at any time in the Ericson matter. 
12 In Minnesota, by statute, unpublished Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions are not precedential 
and cannot be cited as precedent. Minn. Stat. § 480A.08(3). 
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different result as to application of the immunity. In Kuberka, the defendant was 
retained by plaintiff as a private mediator in divorce proceedings. Id. at *l. The 
defendant was subsequently selected by stipulation of the plaintiff and his wife as a 
time expeditor in determining child custody. Id. Subsequently, the court appointed 
defendant as a custody evaluator based upon the defendant's representation to the 
court that she was nearly done with her evaluation. Id. The plaintiff then filed suit 
against the defendant, alleging that she made misrepresentations concerning her 
evaluation in order to obtain appointment as a custody evaluator. Id. The 
defendant sought summary judgment on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity. Id. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of a district court to 
deny a summary judgment motion made on immunity grounds based upon the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding misrepresentations in the 
appointment of a custody evaluator and challenged conduct beyond the scope of the 
duties of the evaluator. The Kuberka court held that, in that matter, "the proper 
focus regarding securing the appointment is not on [defendant's] individual acts as 
the evaluator, but on the actions she undertook to become the evaluator, before 
immunity would attach." Id. In particular, the court expressed concern about 
"whether [defendant] misrepresented her qualifications to the court and the 
[plaintiff]" prior to her appointment. Id. Nothing in the Idaho decision of McKay 
(nor La Serena nor Lythgoe) suggest that the appointment process itself is beyond 
the scope of the immunity. Moreover, as discussed above, the Kuberka case 1s 
factually different in terms of the allegations regarding appointment. 
RESPONDENT ROBINSON'S BRIEF 24 
Accordingly, even while appellant Colafranceschi seeks to predicate his 
litigation upon claimed defects in the appointment process, the scope of the quasi-
judicial immunity still applies, and the District Court's dismissal of Colafranceschi's 
action should be affirmed. 
4. Even were there an exception to immunity recognized in Idaho. 
appellant Colafranceschi failed to plead appropriate facts in 
support of such an exception. 
As above, the quasi-judicial immunity extends to the appointment process, 
as correctly held by Judge Schroeder. Even were this Court to narrow the 
immunity to not include the appointment process, however, the Second Amended 
Complaint fails to adequately plead allegations that would sustain appellant 
Colafranceschi's action against appellee Robinson. See, e.g., Anderson & Nafziger 
v. G. T. Newcomb. Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 179, 595 P.2d 709, 713 (1979) ("This Court 
has generally held that where an order of a lower court is correct but is based upon 
an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory."). 
The Second Amended Complaint is devoid of allegations that Robinson 
proactively sought appointment to Colafranceschi's actions for the particular 
evaluations at issue. To the contrary, the allegations of the Complaint only assert 
that (1) Ms. Robinson sent a letter to the court with a resume detailing her 
experience and offering her assistance (R. at 143-144, 1JHI2-3)13; (2) Ms. Robinson 
went to lunch with Judge Boomer and others in January 2011 (R. at 144, <JI<JI4-6); 
and (3) at that lunch, did not speak about Colafranceschi's case. (Id.) This course 
13 The Second Amended Complaint is unclear on what specific misrepresentations were allegedly 
made in Ms. Robinson's letter or resume. 
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of conducted can be readily contrasted with the differing fact pattern in Kuberka, 
discussed above, wherein the defendant made specific representations to the 
plaintiff and the court concerning her qualifications and the status of her evaluation 
in the course of obtaining appointment as the evaluator. 2007 WL 3525, at *l. 
Here, the primary allegation that appears to allege misrepresentation by 
Robinson is confusing and would otherwise fail to satisfy the specificity 
requirements of Rule 9. Colafranceschi asserts that: 
6. Early January 2011 at a lunch that included Judge Boomer, 
Ashley Robinson, Doug Miller and Carol Brockman, Ms. Robinson 
willfully misrepresented her qualifications to the court staff. Ms. 
Robinson claimed to have experience in home studies when in fact she 
had never done a home study of this sort. She had done case work 
with foster care children and health and welfare case [sic]. Ms. 
Robinson had never performed a private home study-like the one 
involved. Ms. Robinson perjured herself by stating otherwise under 
oath at the August 29th 2012 hearing. 
(R. at 144, <]{6.) Thus, Colafranceschi simultaneously concedes that Robinson does 
have casework experience (accord, R. at 160, <]{79), but then complains that 
Robinson had not done one "of this sort" or "like the one involved." Ultimately, the 
Second Amended Complaint is devoid of two basic allegations. First, there is no 
allegation that Robinson specifically misrepresented her ability to perform the 
specific assignments in the Ericson and Schoonover matters before the assignments. 
In fact, the Second Amended Complaint acknowledges that appellant 
Colafranceschi was not discussed prior to appointment according to appellee 
Robinson. (R. at 144, <]{4-"Ms. Robinson denied talking about plaintiff during 
lunch.") Instead, the complaint only asserts that Judge Boomer himself believed 
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she was qualified at the time of appointment (R. at 145-146, <J[12) based upon his 
own understanding (rather than any specific representation she made regarding her 
suitability to be appointed to those two specific matters for the specific evaluations 
to be made). 
Second, appellant Colafranceschi's argument remams predicated on the 
court's ultimate rejection of Robinson as an expert by Judge Comstock based upon 
Rule 702 concerns. (e.g., R. at 150, <j{30) The rejection of Robinson as an expert 
under Rule 702, as alleged, was not predicated on any kind of misrepresentation 
made by her based upon her history of performing custodial evaluations prior to her 
appointment, but instead is alleged to have been based upon Judge Comstock's 
finding that, based upon different legal standards, additional experience in a 
specific subset of custodial evaluations would be required. (Id.) In this context, 
immunity has been afforded, as the appropriate avenue for challenging an expert on 
experience grounds is via a motion to exclude based upon Rule 702, not via a 
lawsuit-which was done by Colafranceschi. See Lythgoe, 884 P.2d at 1091 ("On 
the contrary, several courts have noted that adequate remedies and safeguards, 
other than civil liability, exist to hold court-appointed experts accountable for their 
actions .... These alternative mechanisms for review are 'largely free of the harmful 
side-effects inevitably associated with exposing judges [and quasi-judicial officers] 
to personal liability."'). 
As such, even were Idaho to recognize an exception to immunity based upon 
pre-appointment misrepresentations like those made in the Kuberka matter, 
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appellant Colafranceschi's Second Amended Complaint still fails to allege 
sufficient facts and the action against Robinson was appropriately dismissed. That 
decision by the District Court should be affirmed. 
C. The District Court's decision denying the Motion to Reconsider 
should be affirmed. 
1. Appellant Colafranceschi has waived this assignment of error. 
In his Notice of Appeal (R. at 313), appellant Colafranceschi indicates that he 
1s also appealing the "Order Denying Motion to Reconsider dated 11/05/2013" 
(which order is located at R. 307); however, Appellant's brief appears devoid of any 
argument and/or cited authority relating thereto. 
For that reason, this Court should deem such assignment of error waived. 
See, e.g., Frogley v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 155 Idaho 558, 564-65, 314 P.3d 
613, 619-20 (2013) ("'When issues on appeal are not supported by positions of law, 
authority, or argument, they will not be considered.' An assignment of error is 
deemed waived, and will not be discussed if there is no argument contained in the 
appellant's brief. This Court holds that 'a party waives an issue cited on appeal if 
either argument or authority is lacking.'") (internal citations omitted). 
2. The Motion to Reconsider was otherwise appropriately 
dismissed. 
In rejecting appellant Colafranceschi's motion for reconsideration, the Court 
noted the lack of any new information: 
The motion is supported by a reiteration of the facts and law 
previously submitted to the Court in opposition to the motions to 
dismiss .... 
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There are no new facts alleged or previously uncited authority brought 
to the attention of the Court to alter the outcome of the Court's prior 
rulings. The authority cited by the Plaintiff and the arguments of the 
Plaintiff have been considered by the Court. Oral argument has 
previously been made based upon those alleged facts and the cited 
authority. Further hearing and oral argument upon the same record 
and authorities would serve no purpose but would add to the expense 
of the litigation. 
(R. at 307.) 
part: 
Rule ll(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent 
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court 
may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later 
than fourteen (14) days after the entry of final judgment. 
Id. When considering a motion for reconsideration, the Court may take into account 
any new or additional facts presented by the moving party. Coeur d'Alene Mining 
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 824, 800 P.2d 1026, 1038 
(1990). In submitting a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule ll(a)(2)(B), the 
moving party has the burden of bringing to the Court's attention through affidavit, 
depositions or admissions, new facts bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory 
order. Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 Idaho 
202, 205, 879 P.2d 1135, 1138 (1994); Coeur d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 824, 
800 P.2d at 1038 ("The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's 
attention to the new facts."); accord, Johnson v. N. Idaho Coll., 153 Idaho 58, 62, 
278 P.3d 928, 932 (2012)("A motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the 
court-when new law is applied to previously presented facts, when new facts are 
applied to previously presented law, or any combination thereof-to reconsider the 
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correctness of an interlocutory order."). Even where a movmg party does not 
present any new facts, it must still demonstrate "errors of law or fact in the initial 
decision." Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 14 7 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Appellant Colafranceschi's motion for reconsideration (R. at 300-306) largely 
reiterated those contentions previously made against appellee Robinson in the 
Second Amended Complaint, which relate (in relevant part) to the contention that 
Ms. Robinson misrepresented her qualifications to a court to secure appointment as 
a custody evaluator in conjunction with allegations of improper conduct during 
appointment. (See generally, Second Amended Verified Complaint, R. at 143-151, 
<J[<J[l-36 re: prior to appointment; and R. at 151-163, <]1<]137-95 re: after appointment). 
Appellant Colafranceschi also attempted to argue a lack of remedial avenues, but 
identified only claimed categories of harm with remedial avenues, akin to those 
already addressed by the Court's order dismissing the action, including: claimed 
unethical conduct (addressable through a professional board), cost of the home 
study (addressable through the court directing payment of such cost), and 
ambiguous defamation and malpractice claims (addressable through a professional 
board and/or through challenge to testimony and report in the handling court). (R. 
at 297.) Appellant Colafranceschi even reiterated the fact that he successfully 
excluded Ms. Robinson's reports in the underlying actions. (R. at 306.) 
Moreover, appellant Colafranceschi's motion for reconsideration also failed to 
appropriately identify any errors of law and/or fact that would support a motion for 
reconsideration. First, with respect to errors of law and/or new law, appellant 
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Colafranceschi only re-cited Kuberka, failing to identify any error of law in the 
Court's Order, instead just arguing that Kuberka dictates a different result, and 
stating that he "disagrees" with the Court's decision regarding quasi-judicial 
immunity. (R. at 301.) With respect to errors of fact, appellant Colafranceschi does 
not identify any particular facts identified by the Court that were purportedly in 
error; instead, he appears to primarily assert that certain "facts" were not 
adequately discussed in the Order. The Order, however, evaluates the allegations 
of the Second Amended Verified Complaint in sufficient summary fashion (R. at 
296-297), and nothing suggests that any fact was incorrectly construed by the 
Court. 
As such, even were this Court to deem this assignment of error not waived by 
appellant, there is otherwise no error, and the decision of the District Court denying 
appellant Colafranceschi's motion for reconsideration should be affirmed. 
D. Appellee Robinson is entitled to her costs on appeal. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40, "[c]osts shall be allowed as a matter of 
course to the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the 
Court." In this matter, Ms. Robinson should be found to be the prevailing party 
because the claims asserted against by appellant Colafranceschi are precluded by 
the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity and Colafranceschi's failure to plead 
sufficient facts to state a claim for misrepresentation as required by Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b), providing this Court with ample basis to affirm the order of 
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the District Court. As such, appellee Robinson is entitled to her costs on appeal in 
this matter, in an amount to be proven to the Court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the September 16, 2013, Order Dismissing the 
Second Amended Verified Complaint, and the November 5, 2013 Order Denying 
Motion to Reconsider, should be affirmed, and appellee Ashley Robinson should be 
awarded her costs on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 40. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I { day of September, 2014. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
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